State building and conflict resolution in Colombia, 1986-1994
No reviews yet
First published: 1999
1 language
ISBN: 9780817311483
Description
During their presidencies, both Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986-90) and Cesar Gaviria Trujillo (1990-94) sought to end the long-running armed disturbance by the leftist guerillas, narcotics traffickers, and paramilitary groups who were controlling many parts of Colombia.
Their attempts to use peaceful means - including indirect bargaining, changes to the constitution to increase democracy, and modifications in the judicial system to make it more effective in suppressing the country's lawbreaking elements - marked a strategic break with the government's 150-year reliance on force.
Funded by the United States Institute of Peace, Harvey Kline traveled to Colombia to collect data for this study. Kline researched printed sources unavailable in the United States and interviewed numerous government officials, politicians, and scholars to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of state building through conflict resolution.
Kline concludes that Barco's and Gaviria's efforts at conflict resolution were only partially successful and points to three major culprits: the lack of a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution in the country; the increased possibilities of conflict with urbanization and modernization; and the vast amount of money brought to the country by the drug trade. Finding no significant improvement in the lives of Colombians, Kline sounds a note of pessimism for Colombia's future.
Their attempts to use peaceful means - including indirect bargaining, changes to the constitution to increase democracy, and modifications in the judicial system to make it more effective in suppressing the country's lawbreaking elements - marked a strategic break with the government's 150-year reliance on force.
Funded by the United States Institute of Peace, Harvey Kline traveled to Colombia to collect data for this study. Kline researched printed sources unavailable in the United States and interviewed numerous government officials, politicians, and scholars to analyze the strengths and weaknesses of state building through conflict resolution.
Kline concludes that Barco's and Gaviria's efforts at conflict resolution were only partially successful and points to three major culprits: the lack of a tradition of peaceful conflict resolution in the country; the increased possibilities of conflict with urbanization and modernization; and the vast amount of money brought to the country by the drug trade. Finding no significant improvement in the lives of Colombians, Kline sounds a note of pessimism for Colombia's future.
