Executive compensation and the optimality of managerial entrenchment View on Open Library

Executive compensation and the optimality of managerial entrenchment

by Gary Gorton

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First published: 1996 1 language
Subjects
Agency (Law) Corporate governance Econometric models Executives Mathematical models Salaries

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